Abstract

China’s efforts to confront both the Soviet Union and the United States during the late Cold War have often been regarded as irrational given its relatively limited national capabilities. From a relationality perspective, however, China’s self-identification as a representative of the developing world and a victim of great-power domination provided an important source of legitimacy for its foreign policy behavior. Following the Cold War, China gradually assumed multiple international roles, including those of a defender of developing countries, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and an emerging great power. This paper examines how these overlapping identities have required Beijing to balance different forms of relationality in its interactions with major powers, developing countries, and international organizations. It argues that China’s changing positions on United Nations reform—including debates over the UN Charter, Security Council reform, and more recent institutional initiatives such as the Pact for the Future and the UN80 Initiative—reflect an enduring relationality dilemma rather than a fundamental shift in strategic objectives. Contemporary UN reform has increasingly emphasized institutional effectiveness and governance reform rather than formal Charter revision. These recent developments reinforce the argument that China’s approach to UN reform continues to be shaped by its efforts to reconcile its dual identity as both a status quo great power and a self-proclaimed representative of the Global South.

Introduction

The question of United Nations (UN) reform has entered a new phase. Rather than concentrating exclusively on formal amendments to the UN Charter, recent debates have increasingly focused on improving the effectiveness, legitimacy, and adaptability of the organization in response to an increasingly fragmented international order. Three recent developments illustrate this shift. First, the adoption of the Pact for the Future at the 2024 Summit of the Future reaffirmed member states’ commitment to strengthening multilateralism while addressing emerging challenges such as sustainable development, digital governance, climate change, and global security. Second, the ongoing Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform continue to explore ways of making the Council more representative, effective, transparent, and accountable, although substantial disagreements remain over questions of permanent membership, the veto, and regional representation. Third, the launch of the UN80 Initiative by Secretary-General António Guterres reflects an institutional effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system ahead of the organization’s eightieth anniversary through internal reforms rather than treaty revision.

These developments demonstrate that contemporary UN reform has evolved beyond the traditional debate over Charter amendment. The emphasis has gradually shifted toward strengthening the performance and credibility of existing institutions while preserving the fundamental constitutional framework established in 1945. Although reform proposals continue to address important political questions concerning Security Council representation and decision-making, the current reform agenda places equal emphasis on institutional resilience, organizational effectiveness, and the implementation of multilateral commitments. Consequently, understanding states’ positions on UN reform now requires examining not only their preferences regarding legal or institutional change but also how they perceive their roles within the broader international order.

China occupies a particularly important position in these debates. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the world’s second-largest economy, and a country that continues to identify itself as the representative of the Global South and developing countries, Beijing simultaneously benefits from the existing institutional structure while advocating reforms intended to increase the representation and influence of developing countries. This dual identity creates an enduring tension between China’s responsibilities as a status quo great power and its long-standing diplomatic narrative as a defender of developing countries against Western dominance. Such tension is especially evident in China’s responses to proposals for Security Council reform, discussions on multilateral governance, and broader efforts to strengthen the United Nations.

This paper examines China’s evolving positions on United Nations reform from the Cold War to the present through the analytical lens of relationality. Rather than explaining China’s behavior solely in terms of material power or national interests, it argues that Beijing’s approach reflects a persistent relationality dilemma arising from its multiple and sometimes contradictory identities: a permanent Security Council member, a rising great power, and a self-proclaimed representative of the developing world. While the contemporary reform agenda has shifted from Charter revision toward institutional transformation and governance reform, this paper argues that the underlying relational dynamics shaping China’s preferences have remained remarkably consistent. The recent UN80 Initiative, the Pact for the Future, and continuing Security Council reform negotiations therefore provide an opportunity to reassess its continuing explanatory value in light of contemporary developments.

To understand China’s contemporary responses to these new reform initiatives, it is necessary to revisit the historical evolution of Beijing’s positions on United Nations Charter reform since the Cold War. Although today’s reform agenda differs substantially from earlier debates over Charter revision, many of China’s underlying diplomatic principles and strategic considerations remain remarkably consistent.

China’s Political Concerns

The UN charter provides two paths for amendment: Article 108, which allows members to revise specific sections, and Article 109, which supports member efforts to review and change the charter in its entirety. Historically, China has frequently expressed its opinions on general UN principles, but in practical terms it has tended to comment on specific charter sections rather than the entire document. An examination of its positions on UN reforms before and after its acceptance as a member state indicates regularly changing demands and goals. According to Chinese scholar Lei Zhao, China’s pre-membership (1949-71) focus was purely on political issues. This changed to economic issues during its early membership period (1972-89), and since 2005 it has emphasized a broad range of general issues such as peacekeeping actions, social development, and climate change. Chinese historian Dai-wei Zhu cites the first successful instance of amending the UN Constitution in 1963 (adding four non-permanent member seats to the Security Council) when arguing that China played a positive role in influencing UN reforms and defending the legal rights of Third World nations even before it was accepted as a member. Whether or not this argument is valid, it does illustrate China’s long history of promoting and protecting its image on the global stage as a leader in the resistance against Western hegemonism and emphasis on power politics. Further evidence of this concern for defending Third World and developing countries is found in most public statements made before and after China’s UN membership. According to this view, its relationships with Third World and developing countries and desire to prove its foreign policy legitimacy have served as guiding principles in all of its proclamations regarding the UN system in general and UN charter in particular.

There are many examples of China withholding support for UN actions, especially concerning issues that China perceives as politicized. In one example given by Suzanne Ogden, as early as 1955 “a leading Chinese Communist international legal expert, Ch’en T’i-ch’iang, even questioned the motives of the U.S. in proposing revision of the UN Charter when it was ‘beyond criticism.’” Two other politicized pre-membership issues that invite closer inspection are Sino-Soviet Union relations and the legitimacy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to hold the permanent “China seat” on the Security Council. In the early 1960s, UN members debated amendments to increase the number of non-permanent Security Council members from 6 to 10 and total members from 11 to 15. The amendments were approved by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963 and went into effect on August 31, 1965. The then-Soviet Union rejected all ratification votes cast by the Nationalist China UN representative. According to Egon Schwelb, an attorney and ex-aide working in the UN Human Rights division and later a lecturer at Yale Law School:

The Permanent Mission of the U.S.S.R. stated that the ratification ‘by the Chiang Kai-shek clique … which represents no one and has no right to speak in the name of China’ is illegal and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations (UN Doc. A/6031, Oct. 5, 1965). This was a continuation of the struggle the Soviet government had waged against the adoption of any Charter amendment in the absence of the Chinese mainland authorities through seven years from 1956 to 1963.

An effort was made to amend Article 109 after the number of Security Council seats was increased. The desire to make changes was based on perceived contradictory language between paragraphs 1 and 3:

Paragraph 1: A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

Paragraph 3: If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

According to the position expressed by the General Assembly, both paragraphs state that “a vote of any seven members” in the expanded Security Council would be insufficient for establishing a UN Charter review conference. Thus, the General Assembly wanted to change “seven” to “nine,” and then submit the amendment for ratification by all UN members. The following is from the Assembly proposal, dated December 29, 1965:

Considering that the Charter of the United Nations has been amended to provide that the membership of the Security Council, as provided in Article 23, should be increased from eleven to fifteen and that decisions of the Security Council should be taken, as provided in Article 27, by an affirmative vote of nine members instead of seven,

Considering that these amendments make it necessary to amend Article 109 of the Charter,

1. Decidesto adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations:

In Article 109, paragraph 1, the word ‘seven’ in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word ‘nine’; 

However, the Republic of China argued that Article 109, paragraph 3 should remain unchanged because measures that had been taken according to that paragraph were currently active, therefore any deletion would cast doubt on its legal status. Although the People’s Republic of China obviously supported all objections raised by the Soviet Union to the legitimacy of the Republic of China to express any opinions on UN Charter reforms, disputes between Beijing and Moscow during the 1960s blocked any expression of complete, unreserved support for Soviet plans or arguments made in a UN context.

Starting in the early 1960s, China expressed a perception of the Soviet Union and United States as acting in collusion to control the UN, which resulted in its call for all UN member states to vote for a UN Charter Review, even though it had no legal standing. The effort failed and tensions between China and the Soviet Union increased, even after China was admitted to the UN in 1971. The Soviet Union, France, the UK and the US all opposed a charter review for various reasons tied to their great power interests, leading Beijing to accuse Moscow as acting in accordance with the same “chauvinist-imperialist foundation” shared by other Western powers. The debate continued for four years. Tien Chin, the Chinese UN representative, made this comment at the 1578^th UN meeting held in 1975:

The majority of countries had advocated a review of the Charter. They had clearly pointed out that the purpose of reviewing and making necessary amendments to the Charter was to implement effectively the purposes and principles of the Charter, namely to ensure that the United Nations conformed to the tremendous changes which had occurred in the international situation and in the membership of the United Nations in the 30 years since its establishment, in order that the numerous small and medium-sized countries which currently constituted the vast majority of Member States could enjoy corresponding rights to speak and to make decisions in the main organs of the United Nations … It could be seen that an increasing number of countries had joined the ranks of those advocating Charter review. The debate had once again convincingly demonstrated that the review and revision of the Charter was a manifestation of the general trend and of the aspirations of people. 

This statement clearly spelled out China’s position regarding the charter review and reform question. While it was based on China’s national interests and relations with other powers, it also communicated concern for how such a review might affect the interests of small and medium-sized countries (“the majority of Member States”), and how China’s position reflected the “general trend and … the aspirations of people.”

Practical Concerns Regarding Specific UN Organizational Reforms Since 2000

In June of 2005, the Chinese government published a position paper describing specific guidelines for UN reforms in general and Security Council reforms in particular. Rather than substantive legal changes, the guidelines were oriented toward practical issues such as development projects, poverty, security, rule of law, human rights, and democracy, with some statements addressing the idea of overall strengthening of the UN and its various organizations. Its suggested approach to reform emphasizes gradual change based on democratic consultations, and a broad consensus on increasing the status and voting power of developing countries, which account for more than two-thirds of UN membership. In the 2005 position paper, China expressed an intention to defend the UN Constitution and its regulatory power. There was only one mention of a specific legal issue—Article 51, which addresses rules for the use of military force.

The June 2005 position paper can be compared with one published a month earlier by the “Group of Four” (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil), which contained language suggesting that the UN Security Council had become anachronistic and no longer reflected actual global balances of power. From the Chinese perspective, any Council expansion should be based on the interests of African countries rather than the Group of Four. Another reason for China’s opposition was the inclusion of Japan, which China described as having more influence on the Security Council than it should only because of its financial contributions to the UN. According to the Chinese argument, Japan’s influence should be tied to its current and past adherence to peace principles, and based on that standard, Japan was not yet qualified for permanent membership on the Security Council. In contrast, Beijing took a passive approach to the potential admittance of Germany and Brazil to the Council, considering that neither country has ever supported China on issues such as human rights. Regarding India’s application to join the Security Council, China expressed concerns about issues regarding the border between the two countries and India’s views on questions involving Tibet.

For the Group of Four countries to achieve their Security Council membership goals, the number of permanent seats had to be increased, and while China had consistently expressed support for UN Security Council reforms, it rejected the idea of increasing the number of permanent seats without a strong regional consensus. This position was explained in detail in a 2004 article written by a former alternate representative to the UN Security Council, Miao-Fa Wu. He explained that since the international situation had changed dramatically since the establishment of the UN, increasing the number of seats held by developing countries was required to maintain a proper representative balance. Thus, China believed that expanding the number of permanent Council seats should be discussed on a regional basis, and that new permanent members should not be given veto power for reasons involving the history behind giving veto power to the original permanent Council members. This opinion was also expressed by Chinese scholar Jian-Fei Liu, who cited the significant contributions of the original five permanent members to winning the anti-fascist war. On the question of veto power, Liu argued that giving it to too many countries would seriously reduce Security Council efficiency.

When discussing principles to be followed when making Security Council reforms, Miao-Fa Wu emphasized four points: a need to ensure that all Council members represent the realities of different world regions; the idea that developing countries formed the majority of UN members but were especially underrepresented on the Council; that becoming a permanent member symbolized a new status as a global or regional great power, therefore decisions to add new members demanded the utmost care; and veto power was such an important political question that it demanded thorough discussion in order to achieve a consensus.

Beijing’s most recent position on Security Council reforms can be found in a statement presented by Chinese Ambassador Ma Zhaoxu at the First Meeting the 72^nd General Assembly (2018), during which intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform were discussed:

Reform of the Security Council is a complex and systemic project bearing on both the vital interests of Member States and the long-term development of the United Nations. It should be a democratic, consultative, transparent and inclusive process with a commitment to continuously build mutual trust and foster consensus. The five clusters of issues, namely, categories of membership, the question of veto, regional representation, the size and working methods of an enlarged Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, form an integral whole with interconnectivity and interdependence. … In the seventy-plus years since its birth, the UN has witnessed its membership grow from 51 to 193. Most of the member states are developing countries and African states account for more than one fourth of the total UN membership. The rise of the developing countries as a group and the ascending power and influence of African states are prominent features of the international relations in the world we live now. The reform of the Security Council should reflect this reality by giving priority to the increase of the representation and voice of developing countries, particularly African counties, supporting African countries’ efforts to rectify historical injustices, fully reflecting the will of regional countries in the decision making of the Security Council and enabling more small-and-medium-sized countries to play a bigger role in maintaining international peace and security.

Recent Developments and Reflections: UN80, the Pact for the Future, and Security Council Reform

The international debate on United Nations reform has evolved significantly since the completion of the original version of this chapter. While earlier discussions largely focused on formal Charter amendments and the expansion of the Security Council, recent reform initiatives have increasingly emphasized strengthening the effectiveness, legitimacy, and adaptability of the United Nations without fundamentally revising its constitutional framework. The adoption of the Pact for the Future in 2024, the launch of the UN80 Initiative in preparation for the organization’s eightieth anniversary, and the continuation of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform illustrate this gradual shift from constitutional revision toward institutional transformation.

Unlike earlier debates over Charter reform under Articles 108 and 109, recent reform efforts have concentrated on improving the implementation capacity of the United Nations, enhancing coordination among different UN agencies, increasing organizational efficiency, and restoring confidence in multilateral institutions. This change reflects the growing recognition among member states that many contemporary global challenges—including climate change, emerging technologies, pandemics, sustainable development, and geopolitical competition—cannot be addressed solely through constitutional amendments. Instead, greater attention has been directed toward strengthening the effectiveness of existing institutions while preserving the legal foundations of the post-1945 international order.

The Pact for the Future represents this broader understanding of institutional reform. Rather than proposing a comprehensive revision of the UN Charter, the Pact seeks to renew political commitments to multilateral cooperation across a wide range of issue areas, including peace and security, sustainable development, financing, digital governance, and future generations. Although the document reiterates the importance of Security Council reform, it deliberately avoids prescribing concrete institutional arrangements or endorsing particular reform proposals. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of maintaining political momentum through dialogue and consensus-building among member states. This approach reflects the practical difficulties of achieving agreement on constitutional questions while acknowledging the growing demands for a more representative and effective United Nations.

Similarly, the UN80 Initiative, introduced by Secretary-General António Guterres, places greater emphasis on improving the internal performance of the United Nations than on changing its constitutional structure. The initiative focuses on enhancing organizational efficiency, reviewing mandates, improving coordination across the UN system, and ensuring that limited financial and administrative resources are allocated more effectively. These priorities demonstrate that the current reform agenda has become increasingly managerial and institutional in nature. Rather than redefining the distribution of political authority among member states, UN80 seeks to improve the ability of the existing organization to respond to increasingly complex global challenges.

These recent developments have important implications for understanding China’s approach to UN reform. At first glance, the contemporary reform agenda appears substantially different from the historical debates examined in this paper. During the Cold War and the early post-Cold War period, Beijing frequently discussed Charter revision, questioned Western dominance within the United Nations, and advocated greater representation for developing countries. Today, however, China increasingly portrays itself as a defender of multilateralism, the UN-centered international order, and the authority of the United Nations. This apparent transformation may suggest that China’s earlier positions have fundamentally changed.

A closer examination, however, indicates considerable continuity rather than discontinuity. China’s contemporary positions continue to emphasize several principles that have remained remarkably consistent over the past several decades. First, Beijing continues to argue that any reform should strengthen rather than weaken the authority of the United Nations. Second, China consistently emphasizes that developing countries—particularly African countries—should receive greater representation within the UN system. Third, Beijing continues to insist that major institutional reforms should be achieved through broad consultation and consensus among member states rather than through majority voting or pressure from a limited group of major powers. These principles remain central to China’s official statements during the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform.

The continuing deadlock over Security Council reform further reinforces the arguments developed in this paper. Despite decades of negotiations, fundamental disagreements remain regarding the expansion of permanent membership, the future of veto power, regional representation, and the overall size of an enlarged Security Council. China continues to express support for increasing the representation of developing countries while remaining cautious toward proposals advanced by the Group of Four (Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil). Its position continues to prioritize broad regional consensus, particularly regarding African representation, while avoiding endorsement of institutional changes that could alter the existing balance among the permanent members.

From the perspective of relationality, these developments reinforce the central argument that China’s approach to UN reform reflects the simultaneous management of multiple international identities. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has strong incentives to preserve institutional stability and protect the authority associated with its privileged status. At the same time, Beijing continues to identify itself as a representative of developing countries and the Global South, requiring it to advocate reforms that expand the voice and influence of those countries within the international system. These two roles do not always produce compatible policy preferences, creating the relationality dilemma discussed throughout this chapter.

If anything, recent developments suggest that China’s relationality dilemma has become even more pronounced. China’s growing economic influence and expanding diplomatic presence have strengthened its position as a major power with substantial interests in maintaining international stability. Simultaneously, Chinese diplomacy continues to employ the political language of South-South cooperation, historical injustice, and the need to reform international institutions to better reflect the interests of developing countries. The coexistence of these identities explains why Beijing often supports the general objectives of UN reform while remaining cautious toward concrete institutional proposals that might redistribute political authority within the Security Council.

Consequently, the recent evolution of the UN reform agenda has demonstrated that the object of reform has changed more than China’s underlying diplomatic logic. Whereas earlier debates focused primarily on Charter revision, current discussions emphasize institutional effectiveness, organizational adaptation, and governance reform. Nevertheless, China’s responses continue to be shaped by the same relational balancing process identified throughout this chapter. The concept of relationality dilemma therefore remains a useful analytical framework for explaining China’s evolving position on United Nations reform in the contemporary international order.

Conclusion

The recent emergence of the UN80 Initiative, the Pact for the Future, and the continuing Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform suggests that the international debate has shifted from constitutional revision toward institutional transformation. These developments also reinforce the conclusion that China’s positions on UN reform continue to be shaped by its efforts to reconcile multiple international identities. While the specific objects of reform have evolved, the underlying relationality dilemma remains remarkably resilient. China’s diplomacy therefore continues to balance its dual roles as both a permanent member of the Security Council and a self-identified representative of the developing world, making relationality an enduring explanatory framework for understanding Beijing’s approach to United Nations reform.