

Global Government and Global Justice

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Abstract: The current “separate but equal” sovereign states system stands as a roadblock to the fulfillment of core economic and civil rights for all persons. States are responsible for supporting their own citizens’ well-being, however unequal their capacity to do so, and they are plagued by inherent biases toward the interests of their own citizens and the alleged justice of their own actions. Achieving the sustainable fulfillment of core human rights will likely require much deeper regional and global political integration, ultimately in the form of a democratic world government. After falling out of favor during the Cold War, this ideal has enjoyed a recent resurgence of support among scholars and advocates from a range of disciplines and approaches. The challenge now is to expand this base of support and channel it into the creation of regional and ultimately global democratic institutions that can more effectively promote and protect the core rights of all persons.

Introduction

Support for a global outlook suddenly appears to be in retreat, or at least on the defensive. Last year saw the unexpected decision by British voters to pull out of the European Union after more than forty years of membership, along with the equally unexpected ascendancy of Donald Trump to the US presidency on an openly xenophobic, “America First” platform. Authoritarian regimes seem re-entrenched in countries such as Russia and the Philippines, while hard-right, nativist populism has been on the rise throughout Europe, in India, and elsewhere.² This nationalist resurgence threatens to further strain the liberal internationalist

model of global cooperation embodied in the United Nations system and its affiliated organizations.

The recent trend towards authoritarianism and withdrawal, however, actually reinforces the arguments for a more, not less, integrated world system, by illuminating how sovereign states perpetuate global disparities in wealth and rights. The structure of the current world order likewise impedes effective solutions to climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the global race-to-the-bottom by multinational corporations on labor and environmental standards. These persistent injustices and failures of collective action point us toward the need for an integrated global alternative. Regional bodies such as the European Union and African Union offer important partial models and especially laboratories for exploring the kinds of global, binding democratic institutions that could better promote global justice, security, and environmental sustainability.

This essay makes the case for forms of global political integration – with a fully integrated, democratic global government as the long-term aim -- as a means of promoting and protecting core individual rights. The first section traces the history of the global government ideal through its heyday in the 1940s and resurgence after the Cold War. The next two sections explore problems inherent in a sovereign states system and highlight reasons to think that deep global political integration could overcome these barriers. The final sections discuss objections and obstacles to realizing this vision, as well as possible pathways forward. Without doubt, achieving the kind of global government envisioned here is a long-term prospect. In the near term however, it provides a valuable goal to orient efforts toward reform current institutions and developing new ones capable of addressing persistent problems of global justice and sustainability.

The History of an Ideal

Ernest Bevin, the blunt-spoken former union leader who mobilized Britain's wartime workforce as Labour Minister under Churchill, was hardly given to public flights of fancy. Yet in a speech in November 1945, Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons that the newly created United Nations Organization should be viewed as a potential world government. A study should be launched, he said, of possibilities for developing the UN into "a world assembly elected directly from the people of the world, as a whole...[who] make the world law which they, the people, will then accept and be morally bound and willing to carry out."³

Perhaps most surprising to a contemporary audience is that Bevin's statement elicited no great surprise from his own. His remarks, in fact, followed a bolder call for world government the previous day from Birmingham-area Labour MP Henry Usborne. While Bevin soon scaled back his own ambitions to a union of Western countries, similar world-union appeals were made by prominent politicians, jurists, scientists (Albert Einstein foremost among them), authors, and other leading lights worldwide.

This was hardly the first time prominent figures had advocated world government. The poet Dante systematically argued for this ideal in the early fourteenth century; others had done so even earlier.⁴ The philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1795 proposed a still-influential scheme of global confederation among states to secure "perpetual peace," though he rejected the idea of a powerful, unitary world state. In the first half of the twentieth century, H. G. Wells, the author of *War of the Worlds*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, and other science fiction classics, wrote numerous books and treatises in support of a fully binding world government. Indeed,

some early proposals for the League of Nations (1920–1946) favored a binding, government-like structure.⁵

The 1940s brought an unprecedented surge in advocacy for a fully integrated global system. Many argued that, after the atomic annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the choice had become clear: embrace world government or risk a fiery end to human civilization. Many academics, journalists, and pundits promoted the idea of world government, and membership in advocacy organizations ballooned throughout the US, Europe, and elsewhere. Prominent political leaders were also on board. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, declared in a 1948 radio address, “I have no doubt in my mind that the World Government must and will come, for there is no other remedy for the world’s sickness.”

Enthusiasm soon waned, however. With the onset of the Cold War, the idea of a global union came to be linked with presumed Communist designs for world domination, and discussion of it was pushed to the fringes of political, public, and academic discourse.

When the Cold War finally thawed, the new geopolitical and economic landscape, with all its attendant challenges, inspired a resurgence of the world government ideal, particularly in academic circles. Leading democracy scholars highlighted ways in which economic globalization has significantly increased the amount of policymaking occurring at the global level. This, they argued, would exclude ordinary citizens from the governance process until new global institutions are created that can greatly expand democratic participation.⁶ Others advocated greater direct accountability from existing bodies such as the World Trade Organization, especially after the 1999 “Battle in Seattle” protests brought higher visibility to

the ways such institutions were shaping the global economy. The goal of a fully global political community, whether embodied by formal institutions or more informal ones in the spirit of the World Social Forums, was once more getting serious attention.⁷

Meanwhile, academics working in a revived cosmopolitan tradition argued not only for promoting democracy at the global level, but also for advancing more comprehensive global justice. Dating at least to Diogenes the Cynic (ca. 412–323 BCE) and running through Kant and beyond, cosmopolitanism has envisioned a global moral community that includes all individuals. In the contemporary context, *institutional cosmopolitans* go beyond moral claims alone and seek to show how intensive global political integration—up to and including some form of world government—could counter domination by powerful states in trade and other governance matters, and also strengthen efforts to address global poverty, security, and a range of other issues.⁸

In a parallel development, some international relations scholars have again begun to argue that the security threat of nuclear weapons is great enough that it should spur the creation of global government.⁹ Other “existential” threats whose risks are said to be so grave that they underscore the need for world government include devastating climate change, the coming weaponization of space, and the development of a possibly malevolent artificial intelligence.¹⁰

Cosmopolitan Vistas

The justifications for world government are many—from the democracy, justice, and security detailed above to other reasons like environmental sustainability, but the global justice case should be the most compelling. Cosmopolitan theorists of global justice tend to begin with a

straightforward assumption that all humans are morally equal, (as in most liberal democratic constitutions and the chief UN human rights covenants), though they diverge on where the assumption leads in practice.¹¹ Some moderate, or ‘rooted,’ cosmopolitans see a role for shared national citizenship in limiting global duties of justice. Others see some robust set of human rights or needs, and duties to protect them, as fully global.¹² These *strong cosmopolitans* ask what constitutes due treatment for all persons regardless of their birthplace or present national identification.

The UN covenants provide an important starting point for articulating these rights. In these international agreements, all individuals are ascribed rights to basic necessities such as food, adequate health care, housing, and education. Individuals are also afforded civil and political rights such as protection from torture, slavery, and arbitrary detention; as well as rights to a fair trial, to free speech, and to freedom of religion. A strong cosmopolitanism would extend the list to rights against unjust discrimination globally, in particular discrimination by birthplace. Guaranteeing more equal opportunities for all persons, regardless of birthplace, would ultimately entail much freer international movement to enable many more persons to pursue opportunities wherever they arise.

Some critics of strong cosmopolitanism argue that it gives too little attention to the relations and duties of national citizenship. The joint sacrifices co-citizens make for the common good and the national sentiments they share, these critics assert, offer a foundation for strong reciprocal moral duties. Many argue further that principles of justice apply inside a sovereign state, while at the global level, only weaker, voluntary principles of charity apply. Such arguments, however, are ultimately circular: they hold that citizens of the same country *should be* in relations of reciprocal duty only with each other because they *are* in such

relations only with each other. It cannot justify the way the world was carved up or why these arbitrary borders should make country of birth so significant to an individual's opportunities in life.

Consider that, despite widely reported reductions in the most extreme global poverty (spurred largely by economic growth in China), approximately 1.5 billion people still lack access to adequate food, shelter, education, health care, or other bare necessities. Another 900 million are estimated to be one setback away from such deprivation.¹³ Only about 9 percent of the world population is classified as upper-middle-income, earning the equivalent of \$20 to \$50 per day, and just another 7 percent is high-income, earning more than \$50 per day (\$18,250/year). The rest of the world gets by on less than \$20 per day, with more than 70 percent struggling to make it on \$10 per day (\$3,650/year), and often far less.¹⁴

A strong institutional cosmopolitanism prescribes deep regional and global integration as a means of transforming the "separate but equal" nature of the current global system, in which countries are viewed as equally sovereign and equally responsible for advancing their own populations' interests, regardless of their actual capacity to do so. The ultimate goal of integration would be the creation of regional and global institutions that promote the interests and rights of all. Such higher-level institutions would also offer mechanisms to challenge repression and rights violations at the national level.

Why Not Just a More Decent States System?

Other critics of strong institutional cosmopolitanism would reject the idea that global government is the right way to approach global justice, arguing that a separate-but-equal system of states that became more decent and democratic over time could do as well, or at least well enough. Yet, there are good reasons to be skeptical, especially if we presume that opportunities should be distributed on a more equal global basis and that individuals should be free to pursue them across national borders. Even for matters such as securing fair contributions to climate change mitigation, such a system poses major challenges. Each state ultimately determines how much it should and actually will do, and self-interest can encourage states' leaders and populations to shirk responsibilities, making global agreements unreachable or unsustainable.

Further, we can expect a system based on sovereign states to routinely produce unjust outcomes because of several inherent domestic biases other than plain national self-interest. First is an electoral or elite bias: leaders have powerful incentives to give strong priority to the interests of their own citizens, especially the most powerful among them. Democratic leaders favor the voters and elites responsible for putting or keeping them in power. Leaders of hierarchical states similarly favor the interests of their own stakeholders over other factions and outsiders' interests. This dynamic reinforces large average differences in life chances among countries.

Second is a fiduciary bias: states are seen as having a primary responsibility to protect their own populations. Indeed, the legitimacy of a state's claim to non-intervention and international recognition, according to the UN-backed Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine regarding humanitarian intervention, is based on the extent to which it actually does protect and promote the interests of its own citizens.¹⁵ By extension, a state that prioritized

duties of global justice could be in violation of its fiduciary duties to its own citizens. Certainly, R2P has the potential to make some significant positive differences within the constraints of the current system. That said, a very strong fiduciary view can lead to an underemphasis on ways in which states are actually able to protect and promote global rights, and can seem to justify inaction (outside of clear emergency situations) on ensuring that the rights of “outsiders” are given due weight.

And third is an “own-case” bias: domestic insiders tend to *underestimate* their duties to outsiders and *overestimate* the justice of their own states’ actions. In the absence of a neutral party empowered to define the extent of their duties and justice of their actions, insiders are left to be their own judges. And groups, like individuals, tend to rule in their own favor—even when they believe they can judge without bias.¹⁶ This insight is a staple of classic social contract theory, foregrounded, for example, in the work of John Locke, and in James Madison’s advocacy of a strong federal US republic. Both saw this as a powerful reason why government is needed to fairly settle disputes and determine duties. Global political institutions would be developed in part to play the role of the neutral judge, helping to determine duties, distributions of resources, and opportunities in the broader global interest, rather than in the interest of a single state’s population.

Also, in a more tightly integrated global community, states’ leaders and individuals would have greater ability to challenge decisions by other states and to attempt to block harmful actions or inactions. Existing fora such as the UN General Assembly and the International Court of Justice offer an indication of how public challenges might be mounted, but decisions made within and by the institutions of a global government would be binding rather than advisory. The European Court of Justice, the affiliated European Court of Human Rights, and

to some extent the European Parliament similarly provide important laboratories for exploring such dynamics.

EU compliance capacity, however, is more limited than would likely be the case under some genuinely rights-protective global integration, where at least some direct coercive capacity would be required to back intervention in cases of large-scale rights abuses. This need not take the form of the overwhelmingly powerful, offensively oriented global army presumed in some 1940s accounts, however. Some dispersal and balancing of policing and peacekeeping forces among global and regional institutions could suffice. Such a configuration—presuming it would ultimately prove possible in the long term to eliminate stockpiles of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction currently held by states—could strike the correct balance between capacity to protect rights and capacity to threaten them, and be an appropriate aim.

Overall, the biases and the barriers a system of competitive sovereign states poses to fulfilling global justice aims should draw us toward *binding, global, and democratic* political institutions. Higher-level bodies must have the capacity to obtain compliance from lower-level ones on laws or rules if core human rights are to be secured for all persons, including those facing state-level repression. The reach of these institutions must be global on issues such as climate change that require global cooperation or compliance to solve. And last, they should be democratic and have clearly constitutionalized rights protections, including strong civil and political rights, giving individuals greater participatory voice and power in helping to ensure that their own protections are sustainable in the long term.

It is not possible to offer an exact blueprint specifying every agency and governing practice for such a world government system. Past practice at state, regional, and global levels of

governance suggests, however, that the architecture we advocate should include at minimum state, regional and global parliamentary assemblies; a professionalized bureaucracy (the large UN bureaucracy offers a partial model), and a global executive and cabinet. The executive or a related commission might include direct representatives of member states' and regional organizations' ruling governments, similar to the current EU structure. Such a form would be less democratic than a more straightforward state-like one, where all representatives are directly elected by those they serve. Still, as a concession in order to secure state support for a full global body, the compromise could be justifiable to pave the way to a global body with strong potential for protecting and advancing human rights.

The principle of subsidiarity, also familiar from EU and federal state governance, could guide political institutions at all levels: that is, decisions would be made at the lowest appropriate level. Finally, in keeping with the ultimate imperative to promote and protect the rights of all persons, we can presume that there would be some global constitutionalization of rights and governing powers—the UN Charter, alongside especially the UN human rights covenants, gives a very preliminary idea of the form this might take, as do the myriad global constitutions proposed since the 1940s.¹⁷ We can also envision the expansion of formal channels of accountability and challenge, through regional and global courts, ombuds agencies and related dispute-resolution bodies. Each could be vital to sustaining rights protections.

How Universal Are Individual Rights?

One potentially significant objection that some would raise against such a vision of global government is that the concept of universal rights itself is Western-centric or does not adequately take global diversity into account. Such objections should, of course, be taken

seriously. One question to consider, however, is this: whose interests would be served by rejecting the possibility of appealing to higher-level institutions as neutral judges? Claims about the threat to diversity posed by regional or global institutions typically come from one domestic group trying to make its voice stand for all voices in a society. Within a dominant religious or ethnic group, leaders may, for example, work to realize their vision of a “true national community.” Yet domestic societies invariably present scenes of deep ideological contestation and competition in discourse about fairness and identity. Presuming that each state contains a unified culture expressing a single set of ideas or political ideals can lead to international quiescence in the face of violations of the rights of minorities.

In India, for example, the governing ideology of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is informed by Hindu nationalist thought, or “Hindutva.” Opposition parties and civil society groups have often accused the BJP of intolerance and/or neglect, especially toward the country’s large Muslim and Dalit (formerly “untouchables”) populations. Indeed, Dalit activists have reached out for international support under this and previous governments: the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights has engaged with the UN human rights regime, the European Parliament, US Congress, and other bodies, asking such bodies to help put pressure on the government to do more against domestic caste discrimination. These Dalit activists have been portrayed in particular by Hindutva-oriented authors and BJP officials as disloyal citizens, effectively puppets of Western agents seeking to impose their own beliefs in place of Indian beliefs.¹⁸ The activists’ efforts, however, reinforce the importance of developing regional and global institutions in which rights-based challenges can be lodged by domestic groups, giving them a hearing by ‘judges’ who have no direct stake in the outcome.

Similar dynamics appear in Europe. Both officials and rank and file members of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which was at the center of efforts leading to the 2016 Brexit decision, evince a strong cultural essentialism based on a perceived “indigenous Briton” identity.¹⁹ This identity excludes people from countries such as Turkey, which has long been a candidate for EU accession, but whom UKIP and similar groups reject as not “fitting” their conception of a broader European identity, much less their conception of a narrow British one. UKIP members expressed alarm at the prospect of Turks someday being able to exercise the EU’s free movement and settle in Britain. Such attitudes, if widespread, can pose a challenge to integration between states, as well as the realization of equal democratic citizenship within states. In each case, a rights-protective approach would work to promote and protect all individuals’ interests in common, and to provide the vulnerable and excluded with tools to challenge the violation of their rights.

Pathways to Political Integration

When we take the long view, it becomes clear that, rather than being in a retreat from the global, the world is more interconnected and, in fact, more unified or uniform in some ways than ever. Consider that, whereas the global system contained an estimated 600,000 independent political communities in 1500 BCE, today some 200 states have carved up virtually all global territory among themselves.²⁰ Will integration stop here? Is there something unique about the current sovereign states system that will prevent it from consolidating further geographically? Perhaps, yet the European Union has for some time acted on the world stage—in trade negotiations, for example—as a single agent for all 28 members (27 if the UK does ultimately sever its ties). Elsewhere, while regional organizations such as South America’s Mercosur and the African Union have struggled to fulfill ambitious aims for regional economic integration, they continue to strive towards a

single external tariff, standardized regional worker mobility rules, and other significant forms of unification—all concrete steps toward greater integration.

Moreover, the entire world economy now operates within a market-driven economic model. Though this model's exclusionary 'neoliberal' character has been rightly challenged, it includes common global rules for trade tariffs, copyright protections, etc., many developed through the World Trade Organization, which includes almost every state as member or applicant. States are linked through myriad other international organizations, trade agreements, and long-term alliances. In addition, individuals around the globe are increasingly connected through shared technology platforms, with access to information about other cultures and unprecedented capacity to organize around shared interests.

What sorts of pathways can we envision, then, for actively pursuing greater regional and global *political* integration? One pathway would focus on accountability by demanding that governmental institutions provide individuals a say in the global decisions increasingly affecting their lives. This is the strategy adopted by the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. It has been actively pursuing the creation of a second UN chamber, alongside the General Assembly, to more directly represent the interests of ordinary individuals within member states. The campaign has generated impressive levels of support, including from the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, and nearly 1,500 current and former parliamentarians from 120 countries. The campaign has done highly valuable work in highlighting realistic global political alternatives, and in identifying some concrete means of enhancing oversight and accountability in the UN system.

A UN parliament, in the near term, however, would lack broad capacity to bind states to its policies. The European Parliament came to accrue more powers in part over concerns about a “democratic deficit” in binding decision-making by EU institutions. The UN Security Council does have some significant, if narrow, powers to authorize intervention, and the various UN agencies perform vital work worldwide in promoting development, health care, human rights, etc. Thus, a UN parliamentary body could have important oversight and accountability roles to play, and it could be well worth creating as part of a broader effort to expand the accountability powers of the more than seventy other inter-parliamentary institutions which operate within or alongside regional and global governance organizations.

Another pathway more central to a strong cosmopolitan, rights-based approach would be the near-term promotion of regional integration, as well as regional and global human rights regimes. In the longer term it would include the development of more empowered global institutions, encompassing the regional ones and operating according to the constitutionalized principles of rights, democracy and subsidiarity noted above.

The cultivation of robust practices of global citizenship would help undermine claims for a rigid and exclusionary conception of state sovereignty, promote a sense of global community, and build pressure on institutions to protect the rights of all persons in that community. The rights-based, strong institutional cosmopolitanism framework views global citizens as those who reach across state boundaries to contribute to rights protections. Many also will contribute to the development of rights-protective institutions beyond the state. Such a framework embraces not only efforts by globally minded activists from more affluent countries, but also those of actors from countries in the Global South who have not been

typically understood as global citizens, such as unauthorized immigrants or the aforementioned Dalit activists.

Unauthorized migrants, for example, can be seen as enactors of “global civil disobedience.”²¹ They violate entry laws for reasons grounded in principles already accepted by the global system, such as seeking greater rights or better opportunities for themselves and their families. Like domestic civil disobedience, migration highlights structural injustices in the global sphere—including the continuing importance of the lottery of birth—and, most importantly, contributes to pressures for institutional change. The Dalit activists can be understood even more directly as ‘institutionally developmental’ global citizens. By their outreach, they highlight gaps in the global human rights regime, and the need for more robustly rights-protective global institutions.

Looking Forward

In the 1940s, elected leaders, social thinkers, and civil society organizations around the world supported the creation of a world government to secure the peace. Although no comparable movement exists today, in some ways the current era offers a far more promising starting point. The democratic UN called for by UK Foreign Minister Bevin in the 1940s would have represented a global population of less than 2.5 billion. Today, more than 20 percent of that number already share common governance, democratic institutions, and laws in the European Union alone, and hundreds of millions more live in areas covered by similar regional arrangements.

Thus, one important means of promoting progress toward a global system which would protect the rights and interests of more persons in common is to support regional

integration—to strive to act as regional citizens. In the near term, this can mean opposing isolationism and disintegration, from Brexit to the America-firstism that resists any deeper North American ties. It also means, however, demanding that regional economic and political integration be more people-centered: more accountable to those who fall under it, and more oriented to a fair distribution of its economic gains and opportunities. The latter can involve supporting ambitious drives to free the movement of workers and ultimately all persons across national boundaries in each region, and advocating inclusive political and social attitudes toward mobile persons.

We can also strive to act like *global* citizens in expanding the de facto integration of all political communities through migration channels to states. Closely related, we can demand from our political representatives that asylum seekers – those fleeing for their very lives from oppression and war – be appropriately incorporated into our communities, rather than further excluded or even mistreated. In all such cases, global citizens can call for accommodation over exclusion, for understanding over division. And they can pressure their elected leaders to fund, support, and strengthen the United Nations system, especially its human rights regime. They can support such worthy global accountability efforts as the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly. They can tenaciously push back on nationalist rhetoric with their own globalist rhetoric—challenging strong and exclusionary claims for state sovereignty and demanding that leaders be open to more encompassing views.

The path to an integrated global political system which actually could provide reliable and sustainable rights protections for all persons is a long and uncertain one. However, progress in the near term does not require certainty that such a government will ultimately emerge. Much can be done now at community and state levels to promote a more global outlook,

while pressing for further integration, and for strengthening and deepening the international human rights regime. Such efforts can pay significant dividends in the protection of rights and the expansion of opportunities, while paving the way for much deeper institutional integration over time.

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² Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, “Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracy: Global Freedom under Pressure,” in *Freedom in the World 2016* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2016), 1–9, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>

³ Quoted in Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, “Renewing the United Nations System,” *Development Dialogue* 1 (1994): 176.

⁴ See Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

⁵ John Partington, “H.G. Wells and the World State: A Liberal Cosmopolitan in a Totalitarian Age,” *International Relations* 17, no. 2 (June 2003): 233–246; Frederick Pollock, *The League of Nations* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1920), 221.

⁶ See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995); see also Andreas Bummel, “Toward Global Political Integration: Time for a World Parliamentary Assembly,” *Great Transition Initiative* (August 2016), <http://greattransition.org/publication/toward-global-political-integration>.

⁷ Robert Wright, “World Government is Coming: Deal With It,” *The New Republic*, January 17, 2000, 18–26; George Monbiot, *The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order* (London: Harper-Perennial, 2003).

⁸ Diogenes is credited with being the first to declare himself a “citizen of the world.” For cosmopolitan integration arguments, see Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” *Ethics* 103, no. 1 (October 1992): 48–75; Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁹ See especially Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 491–542.

¹⁰ Luis Cabrera, “An Interview with Daniel Deudney,” World Government Research Network, accessed July 13, 2017, <http://wgresearch.org/an-interview-with-daniel-h-deudney/>

¹¹ Especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also the non-binding UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

For a full listing of UN human rights instruments and declarations, see

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHumanRightsInstruments.aspx>.

¹² The strong cosmopolitan approach is more fully elaborated in Luis Cabrera, *Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State* (London: Routledge, 2004); see also Cabrera, *The Practice of Global Citizenship* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹³ Sabina Alkire, José Manuel Roche, and Suman Seth, *Multidimensional Poverty Index 2013* (Oxford, UK: Oxford Human Development and Poverty Initiative, 2014).

¹⁴ Pew Research Center, “World Population by Income: How Many Live on How Much and Where,” July 8, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/global-population-by-income/>.

¹⁵ United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. “The Responsibility to Protect.,” accessed July 13, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html>.

¹⁶ On the biases, see Cabrera, *The Practice of Global Citizenship*, Chapters 2, 3, and 9.

¹⁷ See, for example, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law: Two Alternative Plans, 3rd Edition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

¹⁸ See Luis Cabrera, “Dalit Cosmopolitans: Institutionally Developmental Global Citizenship in Struggles against Caste Discrimination,” *Review of International Studies* 43, no. 2 (April 2017): 280–301.

¹⁹ The author interviewed some 25 UKIP elected officials, party leaders and rank and file members in various English counties in 2014–15.

²⁰ Robert L. Carneiro, “The Political Unification of the World: Whether, When, and How—Some Speculations,” *Cross Cultural Research* 38, no. 2 (May 2004): 162–177.

²¹ See Cabrera, *The Practice of Global Citizenship*, Chapter 5.